Author: Efrat, Asif
Title: Governing Guns, Opposing Opium: The Politics of Internationally Regulated Goods
Summary: Contrary to the general trend of trade liberalization, specific goods - such as small arms,
drugs and antiquities - have come under increasing international control in recent
decades through a set of international regulatory agreements. The motivation for
international regulation has been the negative externalities that these goods involve, such
as fatalities and refugee flows stemming from rampant gun violence, crime associated
with widespread drug abuse, and archaeological destruction caused by antiquities looting.
Yet despite the severity of the problems it addresses, international regulation has been
extremely controversial. The dissertation seeks to account for the highly-divergent
preferences of governments over the extent of - and even need for - the international
control of these goods. I argue that governments that face the trade's negative effects
upon their own countries favor strong international regulation. So do governments that
are concerned about secondary externalities - the trade's negative effects on foreign
countries. Concern about secondary externalities may result from pressure of principled
actors committed to worldwide suppression of trade that they deem harmful. Proregulation
governments, however, meet with resistance from governments guarding the
interests of exporters or consumers who wish to maintain the trade uncontrolled. Given
the absence of shared interest in cooperation, the resulting international regulation
typically reflects the preferences of the powerful actors.
Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Department of Government, 2008. 433p.
Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Available at Rutgers Criminal Justice Library.
Year: 2008
Country: International
URL:
Shelf Number: 150082
Keywords:
Illegal Trade
Illicit Trade
International Regulation of GoodsInternational Trade
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